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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARIO B. BELTRAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL SERVICES, 
an Agency of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints; and 
JOHN DOES I THROUGH V, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 960079-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals Court has original jurisdiction 
of this matter in accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 
Constitution of Utah and Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(k) (1994 as 
Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal relates to the trial court's action 
in granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Appellant contends that the trial court committed error in 
granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and relies 
upon three lines of reasoning to support his position. 
1. The Trial Court Committed Error in Ruling that there 
were no Material Facts Precluding the Granting of 
Summary Judgment. 
The Appellant preserved this issue for appeal in his 
response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and 
affidavit (R. 227-259). 
Because summary judgment by definition does not resolve 
factual issues, an appellate challenge to the granting of 
summary judgment presents only questions of law for review. The 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, with no 
deference to the trial court's determination. Country Oaks 
Condominium Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 
1993); Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 
798, 800 (Utah 1992); Perkins v. Great-Western Assurance Company, 
814 P.2d 1125 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve, 
Inc. v. Dixie Power and Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). 
The appellate court is to consider the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the losing party and affirms "only where it 
appears that there is no genuine issue of fact, or where, even 
according to the facts as contended by the losing party, the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." D & L 
Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989); Themy v. 
Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 1979). The 
nondeferential standard of review also applies to the threshold 
issue of whether there are no material issues of fact such that 
summary judgment is in order. Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. 
v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
2. Did the Trial Court Error in Ruling, as a Matter of 
Law, that the Appellant was not Excused from Filing 
a Notice of Paternity by the "Impossibility" Exception 
as Formulated in Ellis v. Social Services Department, 
615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1980) and Utah Code Annotated 
78-30-4.8 (Supp. 1994). 
The Appellant reserved the issue for appellate review in his 
response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
his affidavit filed in connection therewith (R. 227-259). 
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The conclusions of law made by the trial court in applying 
Ellis are reviewed for correctness, with no difference to the 
trial courtT s conclusions. Country Oaks Condominium Management 
Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1993); Allen v. 
Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 
1992); Perkins v. Great-Western Assurance Company, 814 P.2d 1125 
(Utah Ct. Ap. 1991); Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie 
Power and Water, Inc., 798 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990). 
3. Did the Trial Court Commit Error in Ruling, as a Matter 
of Law, that the Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, 
in the Matter of the Adoption of W, 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 
20 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), is Dispositive of the Issues 
in this Case and, As Applied to the Facts of this Case, 
is the Utah Adoption Statute, Requiring the Filing 
of a Notice of Paternity, Constitutional. 
The Appellate reserved his right to challenge the trial 
courtf s findings on appeal in his response to the DefendantsT 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in his affidavit filed with the 
court (R. 227-259). 
The issue raised herein is a question of law. The appellate 
court is not obligated to give deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law but reviews them for correctness. Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 
P.2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah 1987). 
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES 
The interpretation of Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994) 
is important in resolving the issues on appeal in this matter. 
(l)(a) Any person who is the father or claims to 
be the father of a child born outside of marriage may 
file notice of his claim of paternity and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best 
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of his ability with the state registrar of vital 
statistics in the Department of Health . . . 
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth 
of the child but must be filed prior to the time the 
child was relinquished to a licensed child placing 
agency or prior to the filing of a petition by a 
person with whom the mother has placed the child for 
adoption . . . 
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree 
of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the 
state's interest in expediting the adoption of 
young children and in protecting the rights and 
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the 
adoptive parents. Therefore, a putative father who 
fails to file his notice of paternity is barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to 
assert any interest in the child unless he proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that: 
(A) It was not possible for him to file 
a notice of paternity within the period of time 
specified in Subsection (2); 
(B) His failure to file a notice of 
paternity was through no fault of his own; and 
(C) He filed a notice of paternity within 
10 days after it became possible for him to 
file. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(4) 
failure to file a timely notice of paternity shall be 
deemed to be a waiver a surrender of any right to 
notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for 
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person 
to the adoption of the child is not required . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff filed this action to assert his parental 
rights to a child born to the Defendant Denise Allan and given up 
for adoption by her through the Defendant L.D.S. Social Services. 
A. Procedural Chronology of the Case. 
1. The Plaintiff's Verified Complaint was filed on January 
11, 1995 (R. 1-21). The Defendants answered the Plaintiff's 
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Complaint on January 30, 1995 (R. 25-29). 
2. The Plaintiff sent his first discovery to the Defendants 
on February 17, 1995 (R. 30). The Defendants responded to the 
discovery on March 27, 1995 (R. 35-37). The Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Compel on April 4, 1995 (R. 38-44). 
3. The Defendants filed a Motion to Assert Exclusive 
Jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act on 
May 12, 1995 (R. 50-157). 
4. On May 12, 1995, the Defendants filed a Motion for 
Joinder of Adoptive Parents (R. 158-166). 
5. On June 2, 1995, a Notice to Submit for Decision was 
submitted to the trial court for a determination of Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel, Defendants' Motion under UCCJA and Defendants' 
Motion for Joinder of Adoptive Parents (R. 168-169). On August 
15, 1995, the court entered its ruling denying Plaintiff's Motion 
to Compel and granting the motions filed by the Defendants (R. 
170-171). An Order interpreting the court's ruling was filed on 
August 30, 1995 (R. 172-174). 
6. The Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 27, 1995 (R. 177-226). The Plaintiff filed his 
response to the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on 
October 12, 1995 (R. 227-259). Counsel for the adoptive parents 
filed their response on October 20, 1995 (R. 262-263). The 
Defendants filed their Reply Memorandum on October 23, 1995 (R. 
264-278). 
7. On November 14, 1995, the trial court denied Plaintiff's 
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Request for Oral Argument and entered its Ruling which was 
subsequently incorporated into an Order dated November 30, 1995 
(R. 284-288). In relevant part, the court ruled as follows: 
. . . The Court, having reviewed the file, 
considered the memoranda of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows: 
1. There is no material issue of fact. 
2. Defendants are entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff has made 
no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity 
with the Utah Department of Health; (b) plaintiff 
is barred from asserting any interest in the child 
and has no right of consent to the child's 
adoption. Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994 
Supp.); and (c) the recent case of In re 
Adoption of W., 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah App. 
1995), is directly on point in rejecting 
plaintiff's legal claims. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted. 
4. Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
5. Plaintiff's request for oral argument 
is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b), Code 
of Jud. Admin., because "the issue . . . 
governing the granting [of summary judgment] 
has been authoritatively decided." 
R. 287. 
8. The Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal on December 29, 
1995 (R. 291-292). 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. The Plaintiff was born on November 27, 1974, is 21 years 
of age and has continually been a resident of the State of 
California (Beltran affidavit, para. 2, R. 234). 
2. The Defendant Denise Allan was 20 years old when she 
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filed her affidavit in October of 1995 and was likewise a 
resident of the State of California, residing with her parents 
(Allan affidavit, para. 2, R. 212). 
3. The Plaintiff and Defendant agree that they began dating 
in 1993 and as a result of their romantic involvement, the 
Defendant Denise Allan became pregnant (Beltran affidavit para. 
3, R. 233; Allan affidavit para. 3, R. 212). 
4. The Plaintiff and the Defendant Allan further agree that 
in approximately March of 1994, one month into the pregnancy, 
Allan informed the Plaintiff that she was pregnant and that the 
Plaintiff was the father (Beltran affidavit at para. 4, R. 233; 
Allan affidavit at para. 3, R. 212). 
5. The Plaintiff contends that in May of 1994, he broke up 
with Allan and for the first time discussed the possible adoption 
of the child. The Plaintiff contends that over a three-day 
period he argued with Allan, told her he would not agree to 
adoption and that he wanted the child (Beltran affidavit at 
para. 5, R. 233). Allan acknowledges that adoption was discussed 
and does not contend that the Plaintiff ever agreed to adoption. 
Allan does not contest that the Plaintiff, at all times, refused 
to agree to adoption and manifested his intent to raise the 
expected child (Allan affidavit, paragraphs 3-5, R. 212). 
6. The Plaintiff contends that he remained friends with 
Allan until she "disappeared sometime in August of 1994" (Beltran 
affidavit para. 6, R. 233). 
7. Allan contends that in June of 1994, approximately four 
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months into the pregnancy, she contacted LDS Social Services in 
California regarding the placement of her baby for adoption 
(Allan affidavit para. 5, R. 212). Allan contends that in July 
of 1994 she requested the Plaintiff to complete a background 
information form given her by LDS Social Services in California 
to be used in placing the baby for adoption (Allan affidavit 
para. 5, R. 212). Plaintiff acknowledges that he received 
adoption papers from Allan in August or September of 1994. The 
Plaintiff refused to sign them but did fill out information 
regarding medical and social background in case of medical 
complications (Beltran affidavit para. 7, R. 233). A copy of the 
forms that were completed by the Plaintiff were made part of the 
Court's file. The cover sheet for the forms, which fails to 
include any heading of the agency or persons preparing the form, 
provides as follows: 
This BACKGROUND INFORMATION form is designed 
to provide you and us with a tool wherein 
significant social and medical information about 
your child's heritage is collected. If you plan 
adoption for your child, the identifying information 
you supply will be kept confidential. General 
information will be shared with your child's 
new family. If you have chosen to raise this child, 
you may wish to use this form to preserve information 
about yourself and the child's mother for future 
use . . . . (Emphasis added). 
R. 203-208. 
8. Thereafter, the Plaintiff continued to make plans to 
become a single parent (Beltran affidavit para. 9, R. 233). 
9. The Plaintiff contends that he was never told that Allan 
had plans to go to Utah and specifically was not told by Allan 
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that she was leaving (Beltran affidavit para. 11, R. 232). In 
Allan's affidavit, she indicates that on August 15, 1994, she 
left California for Utah where she planned to complete her 
pregnancy (Allan affidavit para. 6, R. 211). 
10. The Plaintiff contends that he did not learn of 
Allan's departure to Utah until late October of 1994. On October 
27, 1994, the LDS Social Services sent a letter to the Plaintiff, 
which provided as follows: 
This letter is to inform you that Denise Allan 
is being assisted by this agency in making an 
adoption plan for her child which is due to be 
delivered the end of November 1994. She has named 
you as a possible father of her unborn child . . . 
Thank you for the background information we 
have already completed. It would be helpful if 
you could complete the family history pages and the 
WAIVER (in duplicate) signed in the presence of a 
notary. A self-addressed stamped enveloped is 
enclosed for your convenience. 
R. 249, Beltran affidavit para. 12, R. 232. 
11. The Plaintiff, upon receiving the letter from LDS 
Social Services, wrote a letter, dated November 3, 1994, to 
Beverly Bekker which states as follows: 
. Please be advised that I have filed a 
Complaint to Establish a Paternal Relationship 
requesting custody of our unborn child in the Superior 
Court of California, Case No. PF000505. 
I do not intend to give up any of my paternal 
rights to this child, and, after blood testing, if the 
child proves to be mine, I intend to pursue custody as 
vigorously as possible. 
I am enclosing a copy of the action filed here on 
October 26, 1994, and Denise Allan will be served with 
this action as quickly as that can be arranged. 
If you have any questions, please contact me. 
9 
R. 184, Beltran affidavit para. 12; R. 232. 
The Plaintiff also attempted to telephone the author of the 
Social Services letter, but Beverly Bekker hung up on the 
Plaintiff and accordingly, the Plaintiff did not have an 
opportunity to discuss all of the issues of the adoption with her 
(Beltran affidavit para. 16, R. 231; R. 273). Beverly R. Bekker 
in her affidavit filed with the court does not dispute that the 
Plaintiff attempted to discuss the case with her (Bekker 
affidavit, R. 131-133). The Plaintiff then corresponded with 
Bekkerfs supervisor, Richard E. Black and forwarded a letter to 
him dated December 11, 1994. The Plaintiff received a letter 
from Mr. Black refusing to provide any information and indicating 
that the adoption had been completed in November, 1994 (R. 1; 
Beltran affidavit paragraphs 16, 17, R. 231). 
12. Allan acknowledges that she received a letter from the 
Plaintiff's mother toward the end of October indicating that both 
the Plaintiff and his family intended to take the child (R. 200-
202, Allan affidavit para. 6, R. 224). 
13. On October 26, 1994, the Plaintiff filed a paternity 
action in California seeking sole legal and physical custody of 
the child (R. 193-199, Beltran affidavit para. 13, R. 232). A 
copy of the California Summons, Restraining Order and Complaint 
were sent to Allan in Utah on November 3, 1994 and received by 
her, as shown by the Certified Mail receipt, on November 7, 1994 
(R. 192, 199). The Restraining Order, issued by the California 
Court specifically provided: 
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You [Allan] and the other party are restrained 
from removing the minor child or children for whom 
this action seeks to establish a parent-child 
relationship from the state without the prior 
written consent of the other or an order of the 
Court. 
These restraining orders are effective against 
Petitioner upon filing a Petition and against 
Respondent on personal service of the Summons and 
Petition or on waiver and acceptance of service 
by responding. 
They are effective until the final decree is 
entered, the Petition is dismissed, or the Court 
makes a further order . . . • 
R. 245. 
14. On November 14, 1994, Allan gave birth to a baby girl 
in a Utah County hospital. On November 17, 1995, Allan signed a 
Relinquishment and Consent for Adoption (Allan affidavit 
paragraphs 11-12, R. 210; R. 191). 
15. On November 25, 1994, Allan returned to California 
where she resides with her parents and attends college (Allan 
affidavit para. 13, R. 210). 
16. On January 11, 1995, the present action was filed and 
on January 12, 1995, Plaintiff requested the entry of default 
against Allan in the California Court (R. 154). The default was 
ultimately set aside by the stipulation of the parties and based 
upon the filing of the Utah action, the California matter was 
dismissed on June 23, 1995 (R. 175-176). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is the Plaintiff's position that there are significant 
issues of fact that have been created by the pleadings and 
affidavits filed in this case. The existence of those material 
11 
issues of fact establishes that the trial court committed error 
in granting summary judgment. 
The facts established by the Plaintiff in this case meet the 
requirements set out in statute and case law for the application 
of the impossibility exception to the required filing of a Notice 
of Paternity. It is submitted that the Plaintiff has established 
sufficient issues of fact to entitle him to an evidentiary 
hearing at which time he could establish that it was impossible 
for him to file a Paternity Notice within the required time frame 
and the impossibility was created through no fault of his own. 
Finally, a rational interpretation of Ellis, due process 
requirements and the adoption statute mandate a finding that a 
strict interpretation of the adoption statute and the requirement 
that a notice be filed within ten days after it becomes possible 
is not fundamentally fair as applied to the facts of this case. 
Accordingly, the fact finder should be allowed to consider all of 
the facts and particularly all of the efforts the Plaintiff took 
to establish his parental rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE PRESENCE OF DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT 
AND THE IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE LAW PRECLUDES 
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a party is entitled to an order granting summary judgment 
only if: 
The p l e a d i n g s , d e p o s i t i o n s , a n s w e r s t o 
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , and admissions on f i l e , together 
with the a f f i d a v i t s , i f any, show tha t there i s no 
genuine i ssue as t o any mater ial fact and t ha t the 
12 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. (Emphasis added.) 
The first issue in determining the propriety of the granting 
of summary judgment is whether or not there are disputed 
material issues of fact. In reviewing that issue, this Court 
considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party and affirms the granting of summary judgment "only where it 
appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material issues 
of fact, or where, even according to the facts as contended by 
the losing party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 
1989); Themy v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526, 528-29 (Utah 
1979); Ward Perkins v. Great-West Life Assurance Company,814 P.2d 
1125 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In reviewing the case to determine 
the presence of disputed material facts, the determination of the 
trial court is given no deference by the appellate court. 
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193, 
1196 (Utah App. 1992). 
The second issue relates to a review of the trial court's 
application of the law to the facts. The appellate court reviews 
the conclusions of the trial court for correctness, without 
according any deference to the trial court's determination. 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991); Country 
Oaks Condominium Management Comm. v. Jones, 851 P.2d 640, 641 
(Utah 1993); Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 
839 P.2d 798. 800 (Utah 1992); Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
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POINT II: THE APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO FILE A NOTICE OF 
PATERNITY IS EXCUSED BY THE "IMPOSSIBILITY" EXCEPTION 
TO THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS, 
A. An Exception to Filing a Notice of Paternity is 
Preserved by Utah Statutes. 
U.C.A. 78-30-4.8 (1994) establishes the requirement of 
filing a Notice of Paternity by a person who claims to be the 
father of a child born out of marriage. The statute, which was 
amended in 1990 to reflect recent decisions of Appellate Courts, 
specifically delineates the rights of unmarried fathers. In 
relevant part, the statute provides as follows: 
(l)(a) Any person who is the father or claims to 
be the father of a child born outside of marriage may 
file notice of his claim of paternity and of his 
willingness and intent to support the child to the best 
of his ability with the state registrar of vital 
statistics in the Department of Health . . . 
(2) The notice may be filed prior to the birth 
of the child but must be filed prior to the time the 
child was relinquished to a licensed child placing 
agency or prior to the filing of a petition by a 
person with whom the mother has placed the child for 
adoption . . . 
(3) The Legislature finds that a certain degree 
of finality is necessary in order to facilitate the 
state? s interest in expediting the adoption of 
young children and in protecting the rights and 
interests of the child, the birth mother, and the 
adoptive parents. Therefore, a putative father who 
fails to file his notice of paternity is barred from 
thereafter bringing or maintaining any action to 
assert any interest in the child unless he proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that: 
(A) It was not possible for him to file 
a notice of paternity within the period of time 
specified in Subsection (2); 
(B) His failure to file a notice of 
paternity was through no fault of his own; and 
(C) He filed a notice of paternity within 
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10 days after it became possible for him to 
file, 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection 78-30-4.1(4) 
failure to file a timely notice of paternity shall be 
deemed to be a waiver a surrender of any right to 
notice of any hearing in any judicial proceeding for 
adoption of the child, and the consent of that person 
to the adoption of the child is not required . . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
Accordingly, the Plaintiff, a putative father, who failed to 
file a Notice of Paternity, prior to the birth of the child 
(November 14, 1994) and prior to the date that the natural 
mother, Allan, relinquished her rights to the child (November 17, 
1994), must establish that it was not possible for him to file 
the Notice of Paternity through no fault of his own. 
B. Utah Case Law Created the "Impossibility" Exception to 
the Filing of a Notice of Paternity. 
The first comprehensive discussion of exceptions to the 
requirement that a putative father file a notice of paternity is 
contained in Ellis v. Social Services Dept., 615 P.2d 1250 (Utah 
1980). At the time Ellis was decided, the Adoption Statute did 
not contain the "impossibility" exception cited in Point IA 
above. Factually, the natural mother and father were residents 
of California and engaged to be married. Two weeks prior to the 
anticipated wedding, the mother terminated the engagement. 
However, both parties were aware of the pregnancy. Several days 
prior to the birth of the child, the natural mother left 
California for Utah and arranged to place the child with Social 
Services. The baby was born on December 15, 1979 and the mother 
signed a relinquishment on December 19, 1979. On December 21, 
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1979, an attorney representing the putative father contacted 
Social Services and informed its agents and employees of the 
putative father's intent to assert his parental rights. JEd. at 
1252-53. 
Recognizing that a putative father's right to custody of his 
illegitimate child is superior to all others, except the child's 
mother, the Court held that the statute in question was void and 
unenforceable as it relates to the facts in Ellis. 
The statute in question provides that if the 
putative father fails to file his notice of paternity 
prior to the happening of certain events, he is 
thereafter barred. In the usual case, the putative 
father would either know or reasonably should know 
approximately when and where his child was born. It is 
conceivable, however, that a situation may arise when 
it is impossible for the father to file the required 
notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through 
no fault of his own. In such a case, due process 
requires that he be permitted to show that he was not 
afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with the 
statute. 
Id. at 1256. 
Noting that Ellis was decided by the trial court on a 
motion to dismiss, the Utah Supreme Court explicitly held that: 
Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to 
present evidence to show as a factual matter that he 
could not reasonably have expected his baby to be 
born in Utah. He should be afforded an opportunity 
to make that showing. If he is successful in 
showing that determination of his parental rights 
was contrary to basic notions of due process, and 
that he came forward within a reasonable time after 
the baby's birth, he should be deemed to have complied 
with the statute. (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 1256. 
The Court found that the assertion that the natural mother 
left California, without advising the putative father, that she 
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declared the father to be unknown and, that she relinquished 
custody within four days after birth, warranted a full factual 
review. 
The Court revisited the issue in Wells v. Children's Aide 
Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984). In Wells, the Supreme 
Court reviewed the issue that had been fully tried at the trial 
court level. The putative father was advised prior to the birth 
of the child that he needed to file an Acknowledgment of 
Paternity. The father signed a form on September 18, but did not 
mail it until September 23, the day of the birth and one day 
before the natural mother relinquished custody. The Department 
of Vital Statistics did not receive document until September 30. 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court which 
had concluded that the father was denied a reasonable opportunity 
to comply with the statute. The Court held that the reasonable 
opportunity standard applies only where it is "first shown that 
it was impossible for the father to file through no fault of his 
own." Id., at 689. In distinguishing Ellis and establishing that 
it was not "impossible" for the father to file, the Court noted 
that (1) the birth occurred in the same state as the fatherf s 
residence; (2) neither the mother nor the agency were attempting 
to prevent him from learning of the birth or asserting his 
parental rights; (3) neither the mother nor the agency knew at 
the time that the child was relinquished that the father was 
seeking to or intending to assert his parental rights. The Court 
held that the putative father had contacted counsel, had been 
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given copies of the required forms and could have filed the 
document precluded a finding of "impossibility." Ld. at 689-90. 
Importantly, Wells was decided after a full evidentiary 
hearing and a fair opportunity given to all parties to establish 
their claims. 
Next, the Court decided in Sanchez v. LPS Social Services, 
680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984). In Sanchez, the Supreme Court upheld 
the application of the statute finding that (1) both parents were 
Utah residents; (2) the mother indicated she was considering 
adoption; (3) the parents attended a counseling session at LDS 
Social Services; (4) the father visited the mother and child in 
the hospital prior to the time the child was relinquished; (5) 
the father knew of the pending adoption and did not protest the 
mother's decision to place the child for adoption. 
The Supreme Court reviewed the issue again in In re Adoption 
of Baby Boy Doe, 717 P.2d 686 (Utah 1986). In that case, the 
mother and father had lived together for three and a half years. 
In June of 1994, the natural mother moved to Utah, while 
pregnant. Although relatives of the mother attempted to dissuade 
contact with the father the parties conversed and in fact the 
putative father came to Utah and spent time with the natural 
mother. The parties agreed to move to Arizona and get married. 
While the putative father was in Arizona locating a job and a 
place to live, the natural mother gave birth in Utah and 
relinquished her parental rights. Although adoption had been 
discussed, all parties acknowledged the putative father's 
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opposition to the adoption. Upon learning of the adoption, the 
putative father contacted a lawyer and took steps to set aside 
the termination of his rights. Id., at 687-88. 
It is important to note that the trial court conducted a 
full evidentiary hearing in Doe, supra and the court determined 
that since the putative father knew where the natural mother was 
residing, that the natural mother intended to place the child for 
adoption and that she was susceptible to her relatives1 
influences. Accordingly the trial court held that it was not 
impossible for the putative father to file his Notice of 
Paternity. Id. at 688. 
In reversing the trial court's decision, the Utah Supreme 
Court distinguished the facts in Doe from Wells and Sanchez. The 
Court found that (1) the putative father was not a resident of 
Utah and had only visited for less than a week; (2) the child's 
mother told the putative father that she would move to Arizona 
and marry him; (3) all parties knew of the father's intent and 
desire to rear the child. Id. at 690. The Court summarized as 
follows: 
Where the father does not know of the need to 
protect his rights, there is no "reasonable 
opportunity" to assert or protect parental rights. In 
such a case, the operation of the statute fails to 
achieve the desired balance and raised serious due 
process concerns . . . because of the clearly 
articulated intent of the father to keep and rear the 
child, the full knowledge of that intent on the part of 
all involved, the representations made by the mother, 
the actions of her family, the premature birth, and the 
non-residency of the father coupled with his absence at 
the time of birth, we cannot say that this was either a 
usual case or that notice may be implied. We, 
therefore conclude that Appellant has successfully 
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shown that the termination of his parental rights was 
contrary to basic notions of due process and that he 
came forward within a reasonable time after the baby's 
birth (such that) he should be deemed to have complied 
with the statute. 
Finally, the issue was reviewed by the Utah Court of Appeals 
in In re Adoption of W, 375 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). In that case, the natural mother, who was a minor living 
at home, was beaten by her parents because of her relationship 
with the putative father. The biological mother was taken to a 
maternity home in Indiana by her parents and then to Las Vegas 
two months later in December of 1993. The putative father did 
not know where the mother was located. The putative father was 
notified of the birth and the pending adoption in Utah in a 
phone conversation in January of 1994. However, the putative 
father did not contact the adoptive parents until March 7, 1994 
and took no action until May of 1994. Again, however, a full 
evidentiary hearing was held by the trial court. E^d. at 20-21. 
The Court held that the failure of the putative father to 
file the Notice of Paternity, after he knew of the pending Utah 
adoption, precluded a finding that it was impossible for the 
putative father to comply with the statute. _Id. at 23-24. 
C. The Facts Established in this Case Entitle the 
Appellant to the Reversal of Summary Judgment and 
a Full Evidentiary Hearing. 
The sole issue raised by this appeal is the propriety of 
denying the Plaintiff a right to a full evidentiary hearing and 
deciding the case by summary judgment. If each of the cases 
decided by the Utah Appellate Courts is reviewed and contrasted 
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with the facts of this case, it is clear that the Plaintiff is 
entitled to go to trial on the allegations set out in his 
Complaint. 
As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court in Ellis held 
that a putative father should be afforded an opportunity to make 
a factual showing that he came forward within a reasonable time 
after the baby's birth, that the termination of parental rights 
was contrary to basic notions of due process and that he should 
be deemed to have complied with the statute. _Id. at 1256. 
In Ellis, the Court found that the case should be remanded 
for hearing based upon the fact that the natural mother left 
California without advising the father; that the natural mother 
declared the natural father to be unknown; and, that custody was 
relinquished within four days after birth. In this case, 
everyone knew that the Plaintiff, Beltran, intended to raise the 
child and would not consent or acquiesce in the adoption. Allan 
left California without advising the Plaintiff. In fact, the 
first set of documents presented to the Plaintiff were from the 
California Social Services. The Plaintiff, after being advised 
of Allan's intent to place the child for adoption, immediately 
filed an action in California and obtained a Restraining Order. 
Those documents were in Allan's hands by November 7, 1994, a week 
before the birth of the child and ten days before she 
relinquished her rights. The agents of LDS Social Services were 
uncoroporative and in fact hung up on the Plaintiff. No one 
advised the Plaintiff of the requirement of filing the Notice of 
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Paternity and the need for that document was conveniently omitted 
from all correspondence by LDS Social Services or Allan. The 
Plaintiff herein was not advised of the child's birth or the 
relinquishment until significantly later. The facts in this case 
are much stronger in supporting a finding of "impossibility" then 
in Ellis. Certainly, the Plaintiff is entitled to a full hearing 
and the right to present testimony. 
In Wells, supra, the Court found that the trial court 
errored in finding "impossibility" because (1) the birth occurred 
in the same state as the father's residence; (2) neither the 
mother nor the agency were attempting to prevent him from 
learning of the birth or asserting his parental rights; (3) 
neither the mother nor the agency knew at the time that the child 
was relinquished that the father was seeking to or intending to 
assert his parental rights. In contrast to Wells, the birth did 
not occur in the same state as the father's residence. The 
mother and LDS Social Services attempted to prevent the Plaintiff 
from learning of the birth or asserting his parental rights. 
Neither LDS Social Services nor Allan informed the Plaintiff of 
the birth and relinquishment even though his desire to establish 
a relationship with the child was known to both. The 
correspondence of LDS Social Services provided a means for the 
Plaintiff to waive his rights but did not explain the need for 
filing a Notice of Paternity to preserve his rights. According 
to the standard set in Ellis, Plaintiff is entitled to prevail on 
the merits. Certainly, the Plaintiff is entitled to a hearing 
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and the right to establish his case. 
In contrast with Sanchez, supra both parents in this case 
were California residents. Although Allan indicated she was 
considering adoption, the Plaintiff was adamant throughout that 
he would not consent or acquiesce to an adoption. The Plaintiff 
never attended counseling with LDS Social Services and 
consistently informed its agents and employees of his intent not 
to relinquish the child. The Plaintiff in this case did not know 
of the baby's birth and certainly did not visit the mother and 
child in the hospital. The Plaintiff had no knowledge of the 
events that took place between November 14, 1994 (the birth of 
the baby) and November 17, 1994 the date of Allan's 
relinquishment. 
The facts in this case are stronger than those which 
warranted the Supreme Court's reversal of the trial court's 
holding in Doe, supra. In this case, the Plaintiff was never in 
Utah. Upon learning of Allan's departure to Utah, the Plaintiff 
did everything that he thought necessary to preserve and protect 
his rights. He filed an action and obtained a Restraining Order 
in California. The Plaintiff immediately tried to contact LDS 
Social Services. The Plaintiff obtained legal counsel and filed 
appropriate actions in Utah. Most importantly, the Plaintiff, at 
all times, manifested his intent to keep the child to the 
natural mother, the agents and employees of LDS Social Services 
in California and Utah and with members of the parties' families. 
As it relates to the Court's holding in Doe, supra, the 
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Plaintiff in this case took immediate action upon learning that 
Allan was in Utah to give the child up for adoption. The 
Plaintiff did not wait for a period of months. Instead, the 
Plaintiff immediately filed an action in California and obtained 
a Restraining Order. 
In summary, the facts which entitle the Plaintiff to a 
reversal of the Order granting summary judgment under the 
existing case law in Utah are as follows. 
1. The Plaintiff and the natural mother are residents 
of California. Aside from the visit to Utah to give birth, 
the natural mother has resided in California. 
2. The Plaintiff has never wavered in manifesting 
a clear intent to maintain his parental rights with the 
child. 
3. Allan submitted adoption papers to the Plaintiff 
from the California LDS Social Services. The Plaintiff 
could reasonably conclude that any action the Plaintiff 
was intending with regard to adoption would be conducted 
in California. The Plaintiff refused to sign any waiver 
or consent and filled out only the relevant social and 
medical histories. Those forms clearly indicated that they 
were applicable in situations in which the parties intended 
to keep the child. 
4. Allan left for Utah without advising the Plaintiff 
of the trip, its purpose or duration. 
5. When the Plaintiff learned of Allan's action, he 
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prepared and filed a Complaint and obtained a Restraining 
Order in California to establish his parental rights and 
restrain Allan from leaving California. The fact that Allan 
left did not deprive the California Court of the right to 
insist that Allan return to California* The Plaintiff, in 
keeping with the Courtf s practice of sending process by 
mail and attaching a waiver for a defendant to sign 
in lieu of personal service, sent all the documents to 
Allan on November 3, 1994. Allan received the documents on 
November 7, 1994 and did nothing to alert the Plaintiff or 
the Court of her intended action. 
6. When the Plaintiff received the LDS Social Service 
letter dated October 27, 1994, he responded in writing and 
tried to contact the author of that letter who hung up on 
him. The Plaintiff continued to try and obtain information 
from the LDS Social Services, which efforts were ignored. 
LDS Social Services and Allan, although knowing the 
Plaintiff's location and phone number, refused to advise him 
of the baby's birth or the pending adoption. 
7. LDS Social Services, knowing of the Plaintiff's 
response to Bekker's letter of October 27, 1994, failed to 
advise the Plaintiff of the need to file a Notice of 
Paternity or its intent to proceed in the adoption matter 
in the Utah forum. 
8. All parties involved in this matter have known 
since prior to the birth of the child, the intent of the 
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Plaintiff to establish and maintain a relationship with 
his child. 
POINT III: THE DECISION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE AND 
THE UTAH ADOPTION STATUTE AS APPLIED TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. Utah Case Law Establishes that a Filing of a Notice of 
Paternity is not Always Required to Preserve the Right 
to Establish the "Impossibility" Exception, 
The trial court, in its decision, relied upon Utah Code 
Annotated 78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, In the Matter of the Adoption of W, supra. The 
trial court reasoned that inasmuch as the plaintiff had made "no 
efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the Utah 
Department of Health" the plaintiff was precluded from 
establishing "impossibility" under the statute (R. 284-292). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in In the Matter of the Adoption 
of W, supra, held that inasmuch as the putative father did not 
file the Notice of Paternity within ten days after finding out 
that the child had been placed with an adoptive couple in Utah, 
he could not take advantage of the "impossibility" exception in 
the statute. It is respectfully submitted that the ruling of the 
Court of Appeals cannot be read as broadly as the trial court 
intimated. The ruling cannot stand for the proposition that the 
failure to file a Notice of Paternity, under all circumstances, 
acts as a bar to the establishment of "impossibility" under the 
statute. In In re W, supra, the putative father did not file his 
Notice of Paternity for more than eight months after he was 
informed that the child was in Utah and was the subject of 
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adoption proceedings. E^d. at 24. Arguably, the failure to file 
the notice affected the notice that the relevant parties were 
entitled to during the various stages of the adoption 
proceedings. However, as it relates to the facts of this case, 
the filing of the notice of paternity is a moot issue in that 
all parties and their representatives knew of the Plaintiff's 
position and under any construction of the facts, the Plaintiff 
could not reasonably have been expected to file a notice before 
the birth of the child or before the natural mother's 
relinquishment is taken. 
The Court in Ellis, supra, explicitly acknowledged that "a 
statute fair upon its face may be shown to void and unenforceable 
as applied." :id. at 1256. The Court then held that a situation 
may arise where "it is impossible for a father to file a Notice 
of Paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his 
own. In such a case, due process requires that he be permitted 
to show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
comply with the statute." Idl. at 1256. In Ellis, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that if a putative father was successful in 
showing that the termination of his parental rights was contrary 
to basic notions of due process, and "that he came forward within 
a reasonable time after the baby's birth, he should be deemed to 
have complied with the statute." JEd. at 1256. 
Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8 (1994 as Amended) deviated 
from the language in Ellis that established the prerequisites to 
the "impossibility" exception. The statute requires that a 
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putative father establish that it was not possible for him to 
file a Notice of Paternity (prior to the birth of the child or 
the time the child is relinquished to a licensed child placing 
agency or prior to the filing of a Petition for Adoption); that 
his failure was through no fault of his own; and, that he filed a 
Notice of Paternity within ten days after it became possible for 
him to file. 
In essence, Ellis requires a father to "come forward within 
a reasonable time after the baby's birth" and the statute 
requires an absolute filing of a Notice of Paternity within ten 
days after it became possible for him to file, regardless of 
whether the delayed filing would have any effect on the facts of 
the case or the notice imparted to the parties. It is 
respectfully submitted that a putative father who is deemed to 
"come forward within a reasonable time after the child's birth" 
is entitled to establish the "impossibility" exception under 
Ellis regardless of whether a Notice of Paternity is filed. The 
Court in Ellis reserves to the fact finder whether the father! s 
efforts were reasonable and the filing of the Notice of Paternity 
is only one element that should be considered. 
B. The Requirement that the Notice of Paternity be Filed 
Within 10 Days After it Becomes Possible for the Father 
to File does not Serve a Legitimate Purpose. 
The Court in Wells, supra, established that the requirement 
of filing a Notice of Paternity was constitutional and afforded 
appropriate due process because: 
. the state has a compelling interest in 
speedily identifying those persons who will assume a 
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parental role over newborn illegitimate children. 
Speedy identification is important to immediate and 
continued physical care and it is essential to early 
and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. 
If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of 
being torn from parents with whom they have begun the 
process of bonding and is prospective parents are to 
rely on the process in making themselves available for 
adoption, such determinations must also be final and 
irrevocable. 
Id. at 206-207. 
The Court in Wells held that "in the common cases" the 
requirement of personal notification "would frustrate the 
compelling state interest in the speedy determination" of 
adoption matter. Id., at 207. There is no question that in the 
common case, the requirement that notices of paternity be filed 
meets all of the due process requirements of the United States 
and Utah Constitution. However, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that there are circumstances when a putative father will be 
allowed to circumvent the need for filing when it is impossible 
for him to do so. The issue then becomes whether the ten day 
requirement or even the late filing serve any useful purpose at 
all. 
The present system allows an adoption placing agency or 
adoptive parents to search a record for a Notice of Paternity and 
if none, proceed with placement or adoption. That system 
fulfills the purpose of the adoption statute and fits within the 
compelling state interests identified in Wells. However, if a 
fact situation is created where it is impossible for a father to 
file a notice, it must be recognized that there are some cases 
where a late filing of the Notice of Paternity serves no useful 
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purpose. If the Notice of Paternity is not filed timely, 
adoptive parents, natural parents, courts and adoption agencies 
act in reliance thereon in placing children and processing 
adoptions. At that stage, the damage is done. If a reviewing 
Court finds that a father could not possibly file the required 
notice, the late filing of that document serves no purpose. 
Filings are checked prior to the entry of a final Decree of 
Adoption (U.C.A. 78-30-4.8(5) (1995). If it is impossible to 
file a notice by that time, a tardy filing is of no use to 
anyone. 
Accordingly, there is no interest that is served by an 
absolute requirement that a Notice of Paternity be filed within 
ten days after it is possible. No one can rely on that 
provision. Ten days after it becomes possible might be ten days 
or months after an adoption is granted. The key is that a 
putative father be required to come forward as quickly as 
reasonably possible. 
Not only is the ten day requirement unreasonable but the 
requirement that "coming forward" means only the filing of a 
Notice of Paternity is also unreasonable. Because a certificate 
from the Department of Health regarding the filing of a Notice of 
Paternity is necessary only when the final Decree of Adoption is 
signed, adoptive parents, adoption agencies and the Courts are 
not expected to check the record at any other time. Accordingly, 
the most reasonable means of "coming forward" may be actual 
notice to the parties and persons involved. That way, parties 
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can act quickly and decisively to resolve the issue instead of 
relying on a late filing that no one may ever review. 
It is respectfully submitted that whether or not a father 
filed a Notice of Paternity and within what time frame is only 
one element of many that must be reviewed. The strict 
construction of Utah Code Annotated 78-30-4.8(3) (1994 as 
Amended) denudes the ruling of the Court in Ellis. Ellis stands 
for the proposition that the parental rights of an unwed father 
cannot be terminated when it is impossible for the father to 
timely file a Notice of Paternity and the father acts quickly and 
reasonably to establish his rights. The Court held that to the 
extent that the statute, as applied, violated the father's 
rights, the due process rights of the natural father were 
violated and the statute was therefore void and unenforceable. 
The exception carved out in Ellis is restricted unreasonably, as 
applied to the facts of this case by the absolute filing 
requirement of a Notice of Paternity. 
As Justice Durham noted in the dissenting opinion in 
Sanchez, supra "the test must be whether fundamental fairness 
has been preserved in the application of the statute to a given 
constellation of facts." Id. at 756. As argued hereinafter, the 
strict statutory construction requiring the filing of a notice 
within ten days after it becomes possible constitutes a violation 
of the Plaintiff's due process rights under the Utah and United 
States Constitution. 
C. The Requirement that a Notice of Paternity be Filed 
Within Ten Days After it is Possible is 
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Unconstitutional as Applied to the Facts of this 
Case. 
It is the Plaintiff's position that it was impossible for 
him to file a Notice of Paternity prior to January of 1995 after 
he became aware that the adoption was proceeding in Utah and that 
California was not the relevant forum for the establishment or 
termination of his parental rights. 
Pursuant to the terms of the statute, U.C.A. 78-30-4.8(3) 
(1994 as Amended), the Plaintiff was required to file a Notice of 
Paternity ten days thereafter. However, the filing of the notice 
at that time would not have served any useful purpose. The 
record in this case establishes that the child was born on 
November 14, 1994, the relinquishment of the natural mother was 
taken on November 17, 1994 (R. 183) and the Certificate of Search 
for Acknowledgment of Paternity was made on November 16, 1994 (R. 
181). 
The search of the paternity records on November 16, 1994, 
satisfies the requirements of the statute that: 
. . . prior to its entering a final Decree of 
Adoption, a certificate from the Department of Health, 
signed by the state registrar of vital statistics, 
stating that a diligent search has been made of the 
registry of notices from putative fathers of children 
born outside of marriage and that no filing has been 
found pertaining to the child in question. 
U.C.A. 78-30-4.8(5) (1994 as Amended). 
The filing of a Notice of Paternity on November 17, 1994 or 
thereafter would not have any effect on the facts of this case. 
To the extent that the Notice of Paternity is relied upon by 
natural or adoptive parents, adoption agencies or the Courts, the 
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failure to file is not relevant after the search has been made 
and a certificate of non-filing is prepared by the director of 
health statistics. Neither the Courts, adoption agencies nor 
persons petitioning in adoption proceedings have any obligation 
to recheck with the Department of Health. If the Plaintiff had 
filed in late November, December, 1994 or January of 1995, it 
would have had no effect. Instead, the Plaintiff in this case 
took steps to provide the natural mother, the adoption agency and 
adoptive parents of his intent to pursue his parental rights. 
The procedures undertaken by the Plaintiff were far more 
effective in providing actual notice to the parties involved. 
The Utah Supreme Court has carved an exception into the 
requirement that putative fathers file notices of paternity. The 
Supreme Court has required a finding of impossibility through no 
fault of the father and a requirement that he act reasonably in 
establishing his claim. As applied to the facts of this case, it 
would violate "fundamental fairness" to review this case on the 
basis of whether a useless late filing should have been made as 
opposed to an evaluation of all of the other relevant indicia as 
to whether the Plaintiff acted reasonably. 
One final note should be made. There is simply no way that 
a factual determination of whether a filing was necessary and if 
so, within what time frame, could disrupt the stated purpose of 
the present adoption statute. The statutory creation of an 
arbitrary ten day period cannot reasonably be expected to 
curtail damage or delay proceedings. The ten day limit is not 
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connected with any of the procedure outlined in the adoption 
statute and the late filing cannot reasonably be interpreted to 
impart notice to any of the relevant parties. A rational 
approach to the exception carved out in Ellis requires that the 
absolute requirement of filing within ten days after it becomes 
possible not be strictly construed. Although the Court has ruled 
that strict compliance is reasonable (Sanchez, supra at 755), the 
rulings have been made with respect to the overall scheme 
incorporated in the adoption statute. There is no useful purpose 
for the strict construction of a ten day period that is 
arbitrary, not tied to any adoption proceeding and is not likely 
to impart notice to the relevant parties. 
The best illustration of the lack of fundamental fairness 
is created by assuming that the Plaintiff complied with the 
statute. If Plaintiff had filed the required notice in late 
November or thereafter, none of the facts of this case would be 
different. However, if Plaintiff had failed to impart the notice 
of his rights by other means, certainly the participants herein 
could have claimed prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
There are significant issues of fact that have been created 
by the pleadings and affidavits filed in this case. The 
existence of those material issues of fact precludes the granting 
of summary judgment. 
The facts established by the Plaintiff in this case meet the 
requirements set out in statute and case law for the application 
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of the impossibility exception to the filing of a Notice of 
Paternity. The Plaintiff has established sufficient issues of 
fact to entitle him to an evidentiary hearing at which time he 
could establish that it was impossible for him to file a notice 
within the required time frame and the impossibility was created 
through no fault of his own. 
A rational interpretation of Ellis, due process requirements 
and the adoption statute mandate a finding that a strict 
interpretation of the adoption statute and the requirement that a 
notice be filed within ten days after it is possible is not 
fundamentally fair as applied to the facts of this case. 
Accordingly, the fact finder should be allowed to consider all of 
the facts, including the filing of a Notice of Paternity, to 
determine if the Plaintiff took reasonable action in making his 
claim. The failure to file a Notice of Paternity within ten days 
after it becomes possible should not be a bar to a putative 
father's right to establish the impossibility exception carved 
out in Ellis. 
DATED this 4jJ** day of 1996. 
ert L. Moody^ Rob
Attorney for Plain^ff/Appellant 
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Ru l ing of Judge Burningham dated November 1 4 , 1995 
A/OV 15 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIO G. BELTRAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES, an agency of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and JOHN 
DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. 950400021 
RULING 
This matter comes before the Court, under Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration (1995), on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has 
reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of counsel, and upon being advised in the 
premises, now makes the following: 
RULING 
1. Plaintiff has made no efforts to file notice of his claim of paternity with the 
Utah Department of Health, 
2. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.13 (Supp. 1995) and because In the 
Matter of the Adoption of W.. 275 Utah Adv. Rep. 20 (1995), is directly on point, 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
3. Plaintiffs Cross-motion for Summary Judgment is therefore DENIED. 
/// 
4. Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
(1995), Plaintiffs request for oral argument is DENIED; "the issue . . . governing the 
granting [of summary judgment] has been authoritatively decided." 
Counsel for Defendants is to prepare an order consistent with the terms of this ruling 
and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court 
for signature. 
Dated this _Jj_ day of November, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: DAVID M. McCONKIE 
MERRILL F. NELSON 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
ROBERT L. MOODY 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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District Court's Order Granting Summary Judgment 
Dated November 30, 1995 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
h i 30 4 23 ?H 'SS 
David M. McConkie (A2154) 
Merrill F. Nelson (A3841) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendants 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1104 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIO G. BELTRAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENISE ALLAN; LDS SOCIAL 
SERVICES, an Agency of the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and 
JOHN DOES I through V, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950400021 
Judge Guy R. Bumingham 
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendants Denise Allan and LDS Social Services. The adoptive parents, who joined the 
action as Doe defendants, joined in defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff 
subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and requested oral argument 
on the motions. The Court, having reviewed the file, considered the memoranda of 
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby orders as follows: 
1. There is no material issue of fact. 
2. Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (a) plaintiff 
has made no efforts to file a notice of claim of paternity with the Utah Department of 
Health; (b) plaintiff is barred from asserting any interest in the child and has no right of 
consent to the child's adoption, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.8 (1994 Supp.); and (c) the 
recent case of In re Adoption of W., 275 U.A.R. 20 (Utah App. 1995), is directly on point 
in rejecting plaintiffs legal claims. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
4. Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
5. Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied, pursuant to Rule 4-501(c)(b), 
Code of Jud. Admin., because "the issue . . . governing the granting [of summary 
judgment] has been authoritatively decided." 
Dated this So_ day of November, ^ 9 g M *
 # 
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lrningham> 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed the foregoing ORDER this £ Pday 
of November, 1995, in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Robert L. Moody, Esq. 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, UT 84604 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Les F. England, Esq. 
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Attorney for Mr. and Mrs. Doe 
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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